Cornell Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 3 February 1969

Article 4

Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community
to Exclusive Dealing Agreements
David M. Cohen

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David M. Cohen, Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community to Exclusive Dealing
Agreements, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 379 (1969)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol54/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85(3) OF THE
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TO EXCLUSIVE
DEALING AGREEMENTS
DavidM. Cohenf
Each nation that became a party to the Treaty Establishing the
European Community1 did so, in part, because of the belief that substantial economic advantages would result from economic integration.
Each nation realized that the fusion of the national markets of the
parties would enable enterprises located within these markets to take
advantage of economies of scale and also would subject them to increased pressure to innovate and to become more efficient.
The vast majority of the articles contained in the EEC Treaty are
designed to obligate the members of the Community to remove state
barriers to trade between their national markets. However, the member states realized that the goals of the Community would not be
achieved if the fusion of the national markets were to be frustrated by
the replacement of state barriers to trade by private restrictive practices.
Thus, the treaty also contains rules designed to prevent private action
2
that would frustrate the integration of the national markets.
Article 85 is one of the principal articles included in the treaty to
deal with private restrictive practices. This article contains a prohibition of certain practices 3 coupled with an exemption for certain other
types of practices.4 This study is concerned with the exemption provision contained in article 85(3) and its application to exclusive dealing
agreements:
The first part of this study is composed of a discussion of the
anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of exclusive dealing agreements. The second part is concerned with article 85, and includes a
discussion of the setting in which the article appears, the derivation of
the article and, finally, a brief note concerning the implementation of
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, J.D. 1964, University of Illinois.
1 Hereinafter referred to as either the treaty or the EEC Treaty.
All translations of the treaty are from the version reproduced in E. SaEN & P. HAY,
DOCUMENTS FOR LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 75 (1967).
2 These rules are contained principally in EEC Treaty. Id. arts. 85, 86.
3 Id. art. 85(1).
4 Id. art. 85(8).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:379

the article by the Community institutions. 5 The final portion of this
study examines article 85, paragraph 3 in detail, and discusses Commission decisions, decisions of the Court of Justice, and the regulation
applying article 85(3) to certain groups of exclusive dealing agreements.
I
THE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS

There are two basic types of exclusive dealing agreements: (1) An
exclusive sales agreement pursuant to which the seller agrees to supply
the goods covered by the contract exclusively to one purchaser located
within a designated territory (hereinafter referred to as the "contract
territory"); (2) an exclusive purchase agreement pursuant to which the
buyer agrees to purchase all of his requirements for the goods covered
by the contract from the seller. 6 Each type of agreement may have either
anti-competitive or pro-competitive effects depending upon its economic setting.
An exclusive sales agreement obviously restricts competition with
the exclusive dealer. If a potential competitor located within the
contract territory desires to sell the contract goods in competition with
the exclusive dealer, he must obtain the goods indirectly from a third
party. The purchase of the goods from a third party will raise the
price of the goods to the dealer's competitor to some point above the
price paid by the exclusive dealer. Unless the dealer's competitor is
more efficient than the exclusive dealer, or unless the demand for the
goods within the contract territory is so great in relation to the supply
that consumers will purchase at a price higher than that charged by
the exclusive dealer, the additional costs incurred by the dealer's
competitor will prevent him from selling the goods at a price competitive with that charged by the exclusive dealer.
If a potential competitor located without the contract territory
wishes to compete with the exclusive dealer, he will be required to
induce consumers to leave the contract territory (thereby increasing
the price of the goods to the consumer by the costs incurred in leaving
the territory) or he will be required to dispatch salesmen into the
contract territory. If the contract territory is defined to encom5 There are four principal Community institutions: The Commission, see 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
4472-544 (1968); the Court of Justice, see id.
4600-872; the
Council, see id.
121.67; and the Assembly, see id.
121.65.
6 See Read, Exclusive Dealing and Market Integration, 6 J. Comm. MKT. STUDIES 131
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Reati].
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pass a large enough area, the dealer's competitor will incur greater
costs than those incurred by the exclusive dealer. Again, unless the
potential competitor is more efficient than the exclusive dealer or
unless consumers will continue to purchase the goods at a price higher
than that charged by the exclusive dealer, the dealer's competitor will
be unable to sell the goods at a price that is competitive with the
price at which the exclusive dealer sells the goods.
Thus, whether the dealer's competitors are located within or without the contract territory, the exclusive dealer is free to increase the
price for the contract goods to the point at which it becomes profitable
for potential competitors located within the contract territory to purchase the goods for resale from a third party or for potential competitors located without the contract territory either to induce consumers
to leave the territory or to dispatch salesmen to the contract territory.
The seller may increase this pricing freedom by granting the exclusive
dealer increased territorial protection. For example, if the seller has
concluded a number of exclusive selling agreements, he may require
each exclusive dealer to refrain from soliciting customers located outside the contract territory allocated to him. 7 Alternatively, the seller
may require each exclusive dealer to pay a certain percentage of
the sale price if he effects a sale in a contract territory allocated to
another dealer.8 This sum may be paid either to the seller or to the
exclusive dealer in the contract territory where the sale was effected.
Finally, the seller may require each exclusive dealer to refuse to supply any customer who does not possess a place of residence in the
contract territory allocated to him.9
An exclusive purchasing agreement may restrict competition with
the seller. If the purchaser has undertaken an obligation to purchase
all of his requirements from the seller, he will obviously not be in a
position to purchase goods from competitors of the seller. Thus, competitors of the seller are precluded from competing for the sale of
goods to the exclusive dealer.10 If the seller has a great number of exclusive purchasing agreements, competitors may be severely hampered
in locating outlets for their goods. This may be true even if the seller
does not possess a great number of exclusive dealers. For example, if
the location of the dealer is important, as in gasoline service stations
7

This has been referred to as "simple" territorial protection. Id. at 132.

8 This has been referred to as "reinforced" territorial protection. Id.

9 This has been referred to as "complete" territorial protection. Id.
10 See Fulda, The Exclusive Distributor and the Anti-trust Laws of the Common'
Market of Europe and the United States, 3 TExAs INT'L L.F. 209, 210 (1967) [hereinafter

cited as Fulda].
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or roadside restaurants, competitors of the seller may be in a position
to locate outlets for their goods but these outlets may not be as effective as those possessed by the seller.
An exclusive sales agreement may create pro-competitive effects.
If a seller desires to introduce a new product into a market, he may
encounter difficulties in locating distributors. Dealers may be reluctant
to invest funds in inventory which may not sell. They also may be of
the opinion that in order to introduce the product it will be necessary
to incur large advertising and market investigation expenses. In this
situation, dealers may demand an exclusive sales agreement with or
without increased territorial protection in order to ensure the recovery
of the costs they incur in introducing the product into the market."
Thus, if an exclusive sales contract serves to induce dealers to
undertake the introduction of a new product into the market, the
contract has the effect of increasing competition among sellers by
increasing the number of competitors.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the
beneficial effects of exclusive purchase agreements. For example, this
type of contract may enable the seller to save selling costs by enabling
him to obtain a secure outlet; the dealer may be able to engage in
"long-term planning on the basis of known costs .... -12 Assuming
that at least one reason for desiring to preserve competition is the
belief that a competitive system enables the consumer to obtain the
best goods at the lowest possible cost, it would appear consistent with
that goal to refrain from entirely prohibiting arrangements that increase economic efficiency and that possess only minimal anti-competitive effects. Given the fact that exclusive purchasing agreements may
increase efficiency, they should not be prohibited if the ability of competing sellers to locate outlets for their goods is not significantly impaired. The degree of impairment must be determined upon a case-bycase basis taking into account such factors as the number of dealers
covered by exclusive purchasing contracts, the importance of location
to the value of the dealer, and the 'duration of the contracts.' 3
Thus, exclusive selling and purchasing agreements are "Janusfaced."' 4 Each type may be detrimental to competition. Each type may
be beneficial in an economic sense. Whether a particular agreement is
beneficial or detrimental depends upon the type of contract, the type
11 See generally Reati, supra note 6, at 140-46.
12 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). See also Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
13 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
14 Fulda, supra note 10, at 210.
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of additional clauses included within the contract terms, and, especially,
upon the economic circumstances surrounding the agreement.
II
ARTICLE

A.

85

General Setting

The goals of the members of the Common Market are set forth
in the EEC Treaty in the Preamble and in Part I. In particular, article
2 provides that the task of the Common Market is
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between its Member States.
The goals of the Community are to be achieved "by establishing a
Common Market and [by] gradually approximating the economic
policies of Member States."' 5 That is, the drafters of the treaty were of
the opinion that the elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions
-leading to a "fusion" of the separate national markets--would have
the beneficial effect of subjecting the industries located within each
state to increased competitive pressure to innovate and to become more
efficient. And these enterprises, by servicing a larger market, would be
in a position to avail themselves of the economies of scale. These beneficial effects would provide the means whereby the Community would
achieve its goals.
The language of article 2 thus appears to indicate that the formation of a common market was viewed by the drafters of the treaty as
the means to an end and not as an end in itself. This position is supported by the fact that article 2 is located in Part I of the treaty,
16
entitled "Principles," and by the actes preparatoires.
If the formation of a common market is to be viewed solely as a
15 EEC Treaty art. 2.
16 See Ellis, Source Material for Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, 32 FORDHAM L.
REv. 247, 249 (1963). Although Ellis refers primarily to EEC Treaty art. 85(1), the
supporting material cited in the article would appear to apply to the entire treaty.
Thus, he notes that the objectives of the treaty are set forth in article 2 and that the
Spaak Report states: "to attain these objectives, a fusion of the separate markets is an
absolute necessity." Id. Since the rules contained in the treaty are designed to result in
a "fusion" of the national markets, it would appear that these rules must be interpreted
as designed to ensure the proper functioning of the means chosen to achieve the goals
of the Community. Thus, all of the rules contained in the treaty should be interpreted
in light of the objectives set forth in article 2.
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tool, it follows that all the provisions of the treaty should be viewed
as "subordinate" to the goals of the Community as set forth in the
Preamble and in Part I of the treaty and should be interpreted in
light of those goals. Pursuant to this principle, each provision of the
treaty should be interpreted so as to further the achievement of the
"tasks" of the Community and not to hinder the achievement of those
tasks. The application of this principle appears to require that when
presented with the necessity of choosing between an interpretation
that would further the formation of a common market but that would
hinder the achievement of the Community goals and an interpretation
with the opposite effect, the choice should be made in favor of the
latter interpretation.
This principle of interpretation is applicable to the rules concerning competition contained in the treaty.17 The drafters of the treaty
realized that "[t]he [establishment of a] common market would not in
itself lead to the most rational division of activities,"18 or "to the
general raising of the standard of living and to a more active rate of
expansion." 19 They realized that "[private] enterprises . . . , owing to
their size or specialization, or to the agreements they have concluded.. ." could nullify by private action the beneficial effects of the
removal of state barriers to trade. 20 Thus, they recognized that the
treaty would "have to lay down basic rules" on this subject. 21
When, therefore, the strict preservation of competition comes into
conflict with the goals of the Community, the achievement of the goals
should take precedence and the strict preservation of competition
should give way.
B.

Article 85-Language and Derivation

The structure of the principal article of the treaty concerned with
competition appears to support the view "that the rules of competition
in the Treaty do not fulfill any autonomous . . . function but [exist
'22
only] ... to ensure the realization of the positive aims of the Treaty.
17 See Italy v. EEC Council & EEC Comm'n, 1961-66 CCH CoMm. MKT. MEP.
8048,
at 7717 (EEC Ct. Just. 1966): "All of the provisions of Article 85 must therefore be considered in conjunction with the principles set forth in the preamble to the Treaty and
interpreted in this light .... "
18 Comitd Intergovernmental Cr6 Par La Conference De Messine, Rapport Des Chefs
De D6lgation Aux Ministres Des Affaires Etrangtres 53-54 [hereinafter referred to as the
Spaak Report], quoted in Ellis, supra note 16, at 250.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 251.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 257.
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Article 85, paragraph 1, provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market: all agreements between enterprises, all decisions by
associations of enterprises and all concerted practices which are apt
to affect trade between the Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market ....
Article 85 then continues by providing in paragraph 8 for the
exemption from the prohibition contained in paragraph 1 of agreements, decisions, and concerted practices that:
[1] contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technological or economic
progress [2] while reserving to consumers an equitable share in the
profit resulting therefrom, and which:
[3] ...neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restric-

tions not indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
[4] ...nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in

respect of a substantial proportion of the goods concerned.
Any agreement, decision or concerted practice that is prohibited by
article 85(1) and that is not exempted from the prohibition by article
85(3) is null and void.

23

In Geitling v. Haute Autorite,24 the Court of Justice recognized
the fact that "there is a common inspiration between article 65 of the
ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community] Treaty and article 85 of
the EEC Treaty. '25 Indeed, the language utilized in article 65(2) of
the earlier treaty (the ECSC Treaty entered into force on July 24,
1952) is strikingly similar to the language found in article 85(3) of the
EEC Treaty. Article 65(2) of the ECSC Treaty provides:
[T]he High Authority shall authorize agreements to specialize in
the production of, or to engage in the joint buying or selling of
specified products, if the High Authority finds:
(a) that such specialization or such joint buying or selling will
contribute to a substantial improvement in the production or distributing of the products in question; and
(b) that the agreement in question is essential to achieve these
results, and is not more restrictive than is necessary for that purpose; and
(c) that it is not capable of giving the interested enterprises the
23

EEC Treaty art. 85(2).

24 "Geiting" Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft m.b.H. v. High Auth., 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 113 (EEC Ct. Just. 1962), abstracted in 2 D. VALENTINE, THE COURT or JuSTICE oF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 232 (1965).
25 See portion of the opinion cited in Ellis, supra note 16, at 254.
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power to determine prices, or to control or limit the production
or selling of a substantial part of the products in question within
the common market, or of protecting them from effective competition by other enterprises within the common market.26
Thus, when the Inter-Governmental Committee, the parent of
the Spaak Report,2 7 was established, the negotiating countries had been
signatories, for approximately four years, to a treaty that contained a
prohibition of certain anti-competitive practices together with an
exemption from the prohibition for certain of those practices. However,
the Spaak Report, while recognizing the need for rules prohibiting
anti-competitive practices, did not recommend the inclusion of a provision similar to article 65(2) of the ECSC Treaty in a treaty establishing
28
a common market.
The failure of the Spaak Report to recommend the inclusion of
an exemption provision may perhaps be explained by the economic
setting in which the ECSC Treaty was concluded. Even before the
conclusion of the ECSC Treaty, coal, steel, iron ore, and scrap entered
three of the four customs areas (Benelux, Germany, and France) duty
free. 29 Benelux tariffs on steel were relatively low and steel tariffs
were wholly or partially in suspense in Germany and France.30 The
only important tariffs were the Italian tariffs on coke and steel.3 1 In
addition, imports of common market products were generally free from
quantitative restrictions as a result of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation program of liberalization. 32 The important task
before the members of the ECSC was, therefore, to establish those conditions of competition that would ensure the enjoyment of the full
33
benefits of economic integration.
This task was to prove extremely difficult. The industries to be
covered by the ECSC Treaty were characterized by "private cartel
arrangements between producers, state ownership, and government
26 There is no official English version of the ECSC Treaty. This translation is from
an English version published by the High Authority of the ECSC reprinted in STEIN
& HAY, supra note 1, at 40.
27 The Spaak Report takes its name from the Chairman of the Intergovernmental
Committee established during the Messina Conference on June 1 & 2, 1955. The report
"has something of an offidal character in that [it] ... was accepted by the Conference of
Ministers at Venice as a basis for the subsequent negotiations which took place at Val
Duchesse near Brussels." Ellis, supra note 16, at 248.
28 Id. at 263.
29 CASE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION 200 (J.
Meade ed. 1962).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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control measures," all of which served to reduce "the impact of economic forces upon the position of individual producers and of whole
industries to a minimum. .. ."34 Given the highly cartelized state of
the industries encompassed by the ECSC, plus the "traditional European attitude that competition is not always desirable and that distinctions can be drawn between 'good' and 'bad' cartels," 35 it is not
particularly surprising that the negotiators of the ECSC Treaty incorporated a distinction between permissible and impermissible cartels
into the treaty.
The negotiators of the EEC Treaty were attempting to integrate
the entire economies of their respective nation-states (except for the
products covered by the ECSC Treaty). They may have believed that
due to the special history of, and the special conditions pertaining to,
the coal and steel industries, some degree of cartelization was necessary
in those sectors of their economies. However, they may have also believed that these conditions did not prevail in the other sectors and
that, in fact, if the same degree of cartelization were to be permitted
in these other sectors, the objectives of establishing a common market
might never be achieved. Thus, the absence of special conditions and
a special history may have combined with a desire to prevent the nullification of enlarged objectives to lead the members of the Spaak committee to omit a distinction between "good" and "bad" cartels in their
report.
In any event, as noted above, the Spaak Report did not recommend
the inclusion of an exemption provision and it was not until October
26, 1956 that Dr. von der Groeben, who had served with the Coal and
Steel Community for many years,3 6 recommended the inclusion of an
exemption provision.3 7 Shortly thereafter, perhaps due in part to the
insistence of the French" (who had incorporated a provision similar
in intent to article 65(2) of the ECSC Treaty into French cartel law in
195339), an exemption provision very similar in wording to Dr. von der
Groeben's proposal was incorporated into the draft treaty.4 0 This provision became what is now article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.
34 Id. at 201.
35 Patricelli, Exemptions From Cartel Prohibition in the Common Market, 7 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 33, 35 (1965).
36 Id. at 37.
37 Ellis, supra note 16, at 263.
38 Buxbaum, Anti-trust Regulation Within the European Economic Community, 61
CoLum. L. REv. 402, 409 (1961).
39 Patricelli, supra note 35, at 36-37.
40 Dr. von der Groeben's proposal provided:
Agreements between enterprises and decisions by associations of enterprises
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The fact that the language utilized in article 85(3) is similar
to the language utilized in article 65(2) of the ECSC Treaty, when
viewed in the context of the "legislative history" of article 85(3), supports the contention of the Court of Justice that the two articles are
closely related. If this is so, the decision of the Court of Justice in the
Geitling 41 case takes on additional importance. In that case, the court
appeared to support the contention advanced in part II of this article4
to the effect that the EEC Treaty rules concerning competition, primarily article 85(1), should be interpreted not as an end in themselves
but as rules designed to ensure the proper functioning of the means
utilized by the treaty to achieve the goals of the Community.
C.

The Implementation of Article 85

Article 87 of the EEC Treaty empowered the Council to enact the
regulations or directives that were required to implement the provisions of article 85. Pursuant to this grant of power, the Council
43
enacted regulation 17 in 1962.
This regulation is extremely complex 44 and its substantive pro:
visions can only be briefly noted. Basically, regulation 17:
(1) Enabled enterprises to obtain a declaration from the Commission to the effect that an agreement was not prohibited by article
shall nevertheless be authorized (and valid) if they have been declared to the
Commission (with a view to their registration) and the declarant can furnish
proof that, in a manner which is equally of benefit to consumers, they help to
improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical or
economic progress, without subjecting the enterprises in question to any restrictions which are not indispensable to the achievement of these objectives and without enabling them to fix prices, limit production or markets or eliminate the
competition of other enterprises in respect of a substantial part of the goods
concerned.
Ellis, supra note 16, at 263.
41 See portion of the opinion quoted id. at 274.
42 Pp. 383-84 supra.
2401-2632 (1968).
43 1 CCH CoMM. MxT. RF-P.
44 The complexity is due in part to the fact that the regulation is the product of a
compromise between the French, who viewed agreements fulfilling the requirements of
article 85(3) as never having been prohibited (the "declarative" view), and the Germans,
who viewed article 85(3) as merely granting to the Commission the power to exempt
agreements from the operation of article 85(1) (the "constitutive" theory). Under the
declarative theory, a decision exempting an agreement would have retroactive effect. A
decision exempting an agreement under the constitutive theory would not have retroactive effect. When the Commission attempted to adopt the constitutive theory, it
met with considerable opposition. Hence, the compromise: Regulation 17 distinguishes
between "notifiable" and "non-notifiable" agreements (a concession to the French); the
Commission may grant an exemption which is retroactive in some cases to the date of
notification and to a date prior to notification in others (apparently another concession
to the French). See Patricelli, supra note 35, at 38-39.
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85(1) (a declaration of this nature is denominated a "negative clearance"); 45 (2) required enterprises, in most instances, to register their
agreements with the Commission if they were of the opinion that their
agreements might be prohibited by article 85(1) but might qualify for
46
an exemption pursuant to article 85(3).
Subsequent to the issuance of Council regulation 17, the Commission issued regulation 27-1 which provided that applications for
negative clearances were to be filed on Form A and that notifications
were to be filed on Form B. The Commission subsequently amended
regulation 27 to provide that certain types of agreements were to be
notified upon a simplified form denominated Form B-1. 48
Form B-1 was to be utilized for agreements:
[I]n which only two enterprises... [took] part and:
-in which one of them . . . [undertook] vis-A-vis the other to
furnish certain products exclusively to it for the purpose of resale
within a defined part of the territory of the Common Market, or
-in which one of them... [undertook] vis-h-vis the other to buy
certain products only from it for the purpose of resale, or
-in which exclusive obligations with respect to the supply and
purchase of certain products, as described in the two preceding
paragraphs [had] ... been entered into between two enterprises for
the purpose of resale.4 9
As of March 31, 1965, 36,322 agreements had been notified or had
sought negative clearances.50 Some 11,628 of these agreements had been
notified on Form B-1. 51
As the number of notified exclusive dealing agreements increased
and as the Commission gained more experience with this type of agreement, the Commission announced its intention to grant exemptions
45 Regulation 17, art. 2, 1 CCH CoMm. MET. REP.
2411 (1968).
46 See generally Schwartz, The Common Market Antitrust Laws and American Business, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 617, 637-42.
47 Although the national courts may apply article 85(1) to an agreement if the
Commission has not initiated a proceeding with respect to the agreement (Regulation 17,
art. 9(1), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
2481 (1968)), the Commission is the only institution
with the power to apply article 85(3). Regulation 17, art. 9(l), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
2481 (1968). Thus, if the parties wish to obtain the benefit of article 85(3), they must,
in most cases, notify their agreement to the Commission. 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
2651-57 (1968).
48 Commission Regulation 153, 1 CCH Coam. MKT. REP.
2694-96 (1968). See id.

2655.01.
49 Regulation 153, art. 1, quoted in SEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 156.
50 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 638 n.100.
51

Id.
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for certain groups of agreements. 52 The member states objected upon
the basis that the Commission could not grant group exemptions without the authorization of the Council. 53 In fact, the power of the Council
to authorize the grant of exemptions by group was subject to some
doubt and was not definitely settled until the Court of Justice upheld
54
that power of the Council in its decision in the Italy case.
The Commission deferred to the objections and requested the
Council to take the requisite action. The Council responded to the request by the enactment of regulation 1955 authorizing the Commission
to grant group exemptions for certain types of agreements. The Commission exercised this power by the issuance of regulation 67/67.11
Basically, regulation 67/67 applies to the type of agreement that
was to be notified upon Form B-l; in fact, regulation 67/67 renders
Form B-1 obsolete. 57 Thus, regulation 67/67 declares the prohibition
of article 85(1) to be inapplicable until December 31, 1972 to
agreements in which only two enterprises take part and in which:
(a) one of the parties agrees to deliver certain products only to
the other party for resale within a specified area in the Common
Market, or
(b) one of the parties agrees to purchase for resale certain
products only from the other party, or
(c) exclusive supply and purchase for resale agreements within
the meaning of subparagraphs
(a) and (b) have been concluded be58
tween the two parties.
The agreements of the type described above may include clauses
that require the dealer not to sell goods competitive with contract
goods and not to advertise or sell the goods outside the contract
territory. 59 In addition, the dealer may be required to purchase complete product lines or minimum quantities, to sell the contract goods
under the trademarks or packaging prescribed by the manufacturer,
and to undertake sales promotion activities including advertising,
customer and guarantee service, the maintenance of a sales network or
stock, and the employment of specially trained personnel 0 However,
52 Kelleher, The Common Market Antitrust Laws: The First Ten Years, 12 ANTI-

TRusr BuLL. 1219, 1228 (1967).
53 Id.

54 See note 17 supra.
55 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
56 Id.
2727-27J.

2717-25 (1965).

57 Id.
58 Id.

2727G, (Reg. 67/67, art 7(1)).

59 Id.

2727B, (Reg. 67/67 art. 2(1)).

2727A, (Reg. 67/67, art. 1).

60 Id. (Reg. 67/67, art. 2(2)).
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the agreement must not involve the employment of industrial property
rights or other rights to prevent dealers or consumers from obtaining
the contract goods from sources outside the contract territory or to
prevent them from selling the goods in the contract territory. 61
III
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 TO EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS

A.

Article 85(1)

Because article 85(3) is not relevant unless and until the agreement
is found to violate article 85(1),62 it is necessary to discuss briefly the
application of the latter article to exclusive dealing agreements.
An exclusive sales agreement can have important effects upon the
effort to integrate separate national markets. If private sellers were to
be permitted to allocate exclusive territories upon the basis of national
boundaries, the effect of eliminating state barriers to trade would be
nullified. However, the effect may be to further economic integration
if the offer of an exclusive sales agreement enables sellers in one national market to obtain dealers in another, hitherto unexplored, national market. Without indigenous dealers in another national market,
legal, cultural, and linguistic differences between nations may effectively prevent or severely hamper a seller's attempt to penetrate the
new market even after state barriers have been removed.
An exclusive purchase contract may also have important effects
upon the economic integration of formerly separate national markets.
For example, sellers located within a particular national market may
have all of the dealers in the most desirable locations tied to them by
means of exclusive purchase agreements. In this situation, it would
be difficult for sellers located in other national markets to penetrate the
local market, thereby effectively nullifying the elimination of state
barriers to trade. 3 However, exclusive purchase agreements may, in
some circumstances, further integration. Assume a product produced
and sold by a seller in one national market. Assume further that this
product is very desirable and that prior to the elimination of state
barriers to trade this product was not extensively sold in other na61 Id.
2727C (Reg. 67/67, art. 8(b)).
62 Italy v. EEC Council & EEC Comm'n, 1961-66 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
8048, at
7718 (EEC Ct. Just. 1966). A group exemption may include within its terms agreements
which do not violate article 85(1), however. Id.
63 See SA. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, 2 CCH Comr. MKT.
REP.
8053, at 7808 (EEC Ct. Just. 1967) (Conclusions of Adv. Gen'l Roemer).
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tional markets. Dealers in the other national markets may be required
to offer exclusive purchase contracts to the seller in order to induce
him to sell his product in their markets. If this is so, the exclusive
purchase contracts may exert a beneficial effect upon economic integration in that they result in increased competition in the dealers' national
markets.
The EEC Court of Justice has also recognized the ambivalent
nature of exclusive sales agreements and held, in Socidtd Technique
Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H.,64 that where these agreements are likely to affect trade between member states, their validity
depends upon "the circumstances in the particular case." 65 That is,
exclusive sales agreements do "not automatically come under the prohibition of Article 85, Paragraph 1."66 Rather, the validity of this type
of agreement depends upon an appraisal of such factors as
the nature of the products and whether or not their quantity was
limited, the position and importance of the licensor and licensee
on the market of the products concerned, whether the contract is
isolated or is one of a group of contracts, and whether the clauses
protecting the exclusiveness are rigid or possibilities are left open
for other channels of trade in the same products through re-exports
67
and parallel imports.

Thus, the Court did not adopt a per se prohibition but instead recognized that each agreement must be appraised on a case-by-case basis.68
The Commission, in the 1966 Jallatte69 decision, held that an
exclusive purchase agreement was prohibited by article 85, paragraph
1 because this type of agreement impairs the ability of other sellers to
penetrate the purchaser's market. However, it should be noted that an
exclusive purchase clause was contained in the agreement examined
by the Court of Justice in Socigtd Technique Minire. Although the
Court did not specifically concern itself with the exclusive purchase
clause apart from the agreement as a whole, at least one commentator
is of the opinion that the portion of the opinion quoted above is
applicable to the exclusive purchase clause and that, therefore, the
validity of such a clause "depends upon its economic effect in the
70
market."
64 Soci~td Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm Gan.b.H., 1961-66 CCH CoMm.
8047 (EEC Ct. Just. 1966).
65 Id. at 7695.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 7696.
68 Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967).
69 Decision of the Comm'n on Jallatte Agreements, 2 CCH Comnm. MKT. RE.
9083 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
70 Kelleher, supra note 52, at 1244.
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Although this opinion is supported by the position taken by the
Advocate General in Socidtd Technique Minire,71 it is possible to
contend that if the prime consideration is the effect upon economic
integration, exclusive sales agreements and exclusive purchase agreements should be treated differently. Due to the linguistic, cultural, and
legal differences remaining after the removal of state barriers to trade,
it is apparent that sellers may have difficulty in penetrating other national markets from which they were formerly barred. It would be
easier for them to penetrate these new markets if they could rely upon
established dealers who are accustomed to doing business in the markets. However, these dealers may be hesitant to assume the risks
involved in introducing new products into their markets1 2 and may
demand exclusive sales agreements as the "price" for assuming the
burdens of introducing new products into their markets. If abuses are
controlled, the beneficial effect upon integration of permitting some
exclusive sales agreements may be significant.
The case for the beneficial effect of exclusive purchase agreements
appears less substantial. Virtually the only situation in which this type
of agreement exerts a beneficial effect upon integration is the situation
in which a dealer in one national market is required to offer an exclusive purchase agreement to a seller located in another national market
in order to induce the latter to sell the goods in the former's market.
The number of instances in which this would be the case, compared
to the number of instances in which a seller is required to offer an
exclusive sales agreement in order to locate outlets, appears to be small.
If a seller desires to maximize profits, he will presumably desire to
enter new markets (especially if the expansion in production will permit him to take advantage of economies of scale) without requiring the
inducement of an exclusive purchase agreement. If, then, an exclusive
purchase agreement is concluded, it is far more likely that it was concluded due to the demand of the seller rather than the result of an offer
by the purchaser. Indeed, if the seller's product is desirable, as assumed
above, this is even more likely since this would give the seller some
degree of market poer.
In addition, an exclusive purchase agreement may have detrimental effects upon iltegration. For example, a seller in national
market A may conclude a number of exclusive purchase contracts with
purchasers in national market B. These contracts may prevent a seller
in national market C from penetrating national market B. Given: (a)
71 Socidt6 Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H., 1961-66 CCH Comm.
MKT. RE.
8047, at 7702 (1966) (Conclusions of Adv. Gen'l Roemer).
72 See p. 382 supra.
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The presumed desire on the part of the seller to enter new markets;
(b) the fact that because of the desirability of his product, the seller in
national market A would have little or no difficulty in locating a dealer
in national market B; (c) the possible prevention of the penetration of
market B by sellers in market C; and (d) the fact that an exclusive sales
contract does not necessarily affect the ability of the seller in market C
to penetrate market B (since the same dealer may carry the goods of
sellers located in market A and in market C), exclusive purchase agreements should be treated more severely than exclusive sales agreements.
B. Article 85(3)
1. In General
a.

"[1Improvement of the production or distribution . . . and

promotion of technological or economic progress .... "73 The Court of
Justice has decided only one case involving an interpretation of the
first requirement of article 85(3). Consten & Grundig v. EEC Commission74 involved an exclusive sales agreement between Grundig, a
German manufacturer, and Consten, a French distributor. The terms
of the contract required Consten to refrain from vending goods competitive with those manufactured by Grundig; to advertise adequately
and sufficiently; to establish a repair shop stocking a sufficient supply
of replacement parts; to provide "faultless" customer service; and to
submit binding orders from six to eight months in advance of the time
of delivery by Grundig. Grundig agreed to refrain from selling the
contract goods, directly or indirectly, to persons other than Consten
located within the contract territory assigned to Consten. This obligation assumed by Grundig was supported by Grundig's distributional
system which required all Grundig purchasers to refrain from exporting or re-exporting.
73 Promotion of economic progress can be "described as a vague catch-all which
would probably be difficult to plead and prove and which largely overlaps the first
category [improvement of production and distribution]." Patricelli, supra note 35, at 43.
It will not be considered separately.
Clearly this first requirement covers services as well as goods and potential as well
as actual improvements. The improvement must be of more than a de minimis nature, and
there must be a causal connection between the agreement and the improvement. See
generally id. at 53-55.
It is less clear whether the Commission may take into account the fact that the
agreement violates some other provision of the treaty in applying article 85(3). See id.
at 47-50.
Apparently, in applying article 85(3), the Commission should apply a "balance
sheet" approach, i.e., should weigh the total value of the improvements against the
detrimental effects. Id. at 51.
74 1961-66 CCH CoNINT. MKT. R-P.
8046 (EEC Ct. Just. 1966).
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Previous decisions75 of the Commission had indicated that an
exclusive sales agreement between two firms located in different member states that prevented the manufacturer from delivering the contract
goods directly to anyone but the exclusive dealer located within the
contract territory was sufficient, in and of itself, to cause the agreement
to result in at least a theoretical restriction, distortion, or prevention
of competition. And this was held sufficient to cause the agreement to
come within the prohibition of article 85(1). In addition, these decisions
had indicated that exclusive dealing agreements that did not offer some
form of reinforced territorial protection to the dealer could be granted
an exemption pursuant to article 85(3). 76 Thus, the important feature
of the Commission decision in Grundig-Consten77 involves the treatment of the parties' contention that: (1) Consten's obligations to
advertise, to provide customer service, and to place orders in advance,
resulted in an improvement of production and distribution; and (2)
the reinforced territorial protection granted to Consten was "indispensable" to the achievement of these improvements.
Previous decisions of the Commission had indicated that exclusive
dealing agreements that did not contain reinforced territorial protection could result in improvements of distribution and production. For
example, in D.R.U.-Blondel,78 the Commission noted:
Having a licensee assures that the products under contract are
offered regularly and more easily on the French market by making it
possible to overcome difficulties due to distance and to linguistic,
legal, and other differences between the country of production and
the country of distribution. 79
Similarly, in Grundig-Consten,the Commission noted that:
The sole-agency system can lead to an improvement in the
production and distribution of the products. This may also be true
with respect to the organization of a post-sale and guarantee service
and to the advance planning which a sole agent must engage in,
but not with respect to advertising, because the fact that Consten
undertook the advertising does not have any bearing on the im75 Decision of the Comm'n on D.R.U.-Blondel Agreement, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
9049 (EEC Comm'n 1965); Decision of the Comm'n on Hummel-Isbecque Agreement,
2 CCH Coin. MKT. REP. 9063 (EEC Comm'n 1965); Decision of the Comm'n on Jallatte Agreements, 2 CCH Coanr. MKT. R.P. 9083 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
76 Cases cited note 75 supra.
77

REP.

Decision of the Comm'n on Grundig-Consten Agreement, 1 CCH
2743 (EEC Comm'n 1962).

78

2 CCH Coma-r. MKT. Rup.

79

Id. at 8099.

9049 (EEC Comm'n 1965).

Comm. MKT.
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proveinent bf distribitioni, but only on the shking of c6sts beiweei
the parties to the contract.8 0
Hcivever, the G6mmissidii's decisioih in Grufidig-C6nn does riot
of attid1e 85(3).
ciiitdiri a ditailed distcssion of the first ie ui &int
Instead, thd Commission a'ssimdd an improvemerit 6of pidduction 8 '
ahd distributibn and pr dceed d to bise its decisioii iipbn the failtife of
the agreemrit td provide cOnsumliers *iih a fair share bf the profit 2
and, esptcially, upon thie findihg that the rditiforctd tefritoiial protection granted to Gonst~n was iibt "ihidispetisTble" to the achi qtifient of
8
the improvements. 3
In the course of affirming the decisidin of the C-omihissidi, the
Coutt of Justibe cbrminented uipn the nature of the reqfiirexfient. The
Court nottd that
not evei-y advahntage derived frqm [ii] ageement... can be conid~red ... an inipr6ve6mefit [wtthiii the meaning 'of artile 85(3)].
...
[A] subjective mthdd, iwhich [*o'uld defif] fhe idea of "improvement" according to the peculiarities of the cntractuil telationship in issue, would not be in keeping with the objectives of

Airticle 85. Furthermore, the very fact that the treaty provides
that the limitatioi bf conipetition must be "'essential" for the improvein~rit in ques[idh dcarly thows ho* imhpoktant thfii improvement must be. That imprdveriirit mu'st, in partictilTi, offer subcompensating for
stantial objective advantages that are capable of
84
the d6triment to competilidfn that it efngehders.
It is difficult to ascertain the ineaning of the Court's distinction
between "objective" arid "subjective" iniprovteifiefits. Possibly the
Court was referring to the Commission's ie6imertce tb the fact that
Consten's assumption of advertising costs did not lead to an "improvement" but was solely concerned with the allocation of costs between
Consten and Grufdig 96 koi4ever, the Cbuit may haved meant much
more than this.
'the Court noted in the course of its discussion of article 85(3):
In evaluating the relative importance 6it the variois parts of
2743 at 1865. Advocate General Roemer was of the
80 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP.
opinion that the Commigsion should not havd disregarded the improvemfient iestilting
from Consten's obligation to advertise. 1961-66 CCH 'Comm MKT. Rr'. J 8046; at 774
(1966) (Conclusions Of Adv. Gen'l R,bier).
81 The Commission may hav6 assuffiid this in order to simpliy th investigation.
See Patricelli, supra note 35, at 51.
2743, ii 1866.
MKT. REP.
82 1 CCH Cotar.i
83 Id. at 1866-68.
8046, at 7656.
84 1961-66 CCH Comrm. MET. REP.
2743, at 1865.
85 1 CCH Comm. MET. RP.
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the agreement, the Commission also had to evaluate their effect in
relation to an objectively ascertainable improvement in the produption and distributiqn of the prpducs and to detrnie vhe~er
the resulting advantage was 86,enqugh to make the restrictions on
competition appear es ,enial.
It appears that the Court has adopted the position that the drafters
of the treaty strongly believe4i that the primary, if not the only, manner
in which the Community could achieve its goals is by the complete elimination of all barriers to trade between the member states. The Court
appears to have adopted a position that focuses upon the elimination
of these barriers,8,7 and it may be of the opinion that if all present
barriers to trade are eliminated and the erection of new barriers is
prevented, the achievement of the goals of the Community will follow
ipso facto.
If this does represent the present reasoning of the Court, article
85(1) should be strictly enforced; if new barriers to trade between the
members are erected by private action, a common market-essential
to the accomplishment of the goals of the Community-will not be
established. If article 85(1) prohibits (at least primarily) agreements
86 1961-66 CPH CoMm. MT. REP. I 8946, at 7056.
87 In Grundig, the Court noted:

An agreement between producer and distributor that is designed to restore
the national partitions in 'trade between Member States could conttic with
the basic objectives of the Comntmniy. The EEC Treaty, whose preamble and
text are designed to remove the barriers between the States and which, in a number of its provisions, strongly combats theiri reappearance, cannoi permit enite'prises to create new barriers of this type.
Id. at 7651. The Court's statement appears in the context of its consideration of an
exclusive dealing agreenent that defined the contract territory according to national
boundaries and that contained absolute territorial protection. However, in Socidtd Technique Mini~re, the Court noted:
[]n order to determine whether a contract containing a clause "granting
n exclusive selling right" falls within the field of application of Article 85,
it is necessary to know whether it is capable of partitoning the market in certain

products between the Member States and of thus rendering the economic interpenetration sought by the Treaty more difficult.
19qi-66 CCH Coaima. MKT. REP.
8q47, at 7696. The special circumstances involved in
Grundig were not present in Socidtd Technique Mnire.
See also S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, 2 CCH CoMMn,. MKT.
REP.
8053 (EEC Ct. Just. 1967):
[Plistortion of competition is governed by the Community prohibitions only in
so 'far as the agreements, 'decisions, or practices can impair trade 'between Member States. To fulfill that condition, an agreement, decision, or practiceI must, on
the basis of all the objective elements of law or of fact, lead to the belief that
it may exercise a direct or indirect influence on the' floW of trad6 between
Member States, contribute to a partitioning of the market, and make it more
difficult to achieve the economic interpenetration intended by the -Treaty.
Id. at 7804.
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that erect barriers to trade between the member states, article 85(3),
providing exemptions, permits the erection of barriers to that trade.
Given the fact that if barriers are permitted, a common market will
not be established, and that if a common market is not established,
the Community may (or will) not accomplish its objectives, article
85(3) must be interpreted narrowly.
If this interpretation of the Court's position is correct, it may be
contended that the Court's interpretation fails to embrace all of the
treaty's goals. One of the prime goals of the treaty is the more efficient
allocation of the resources possessed by the member states. Removal
of barriers to trade erected by state or private action is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for the achievement of this goal.
If resources are to be allocated by market forces, they will be
allocated efficiently only if competition is preserved. To ensure the
preservation of competition it may prove necessary to prohibit agreements that restrict competition but that do not prevent the formation
of a common market.
If the Court were to adopt a more liberal interpretation of article
85(1) based upon the premise that the article was designed to permit
the free play of competition to ensure the efficient allocation of resources, the Court's interpretation of article 85(3) should also change.
If the goal of the Community is a more efficient allocation of resources,
then article 85(3) should be interpreted as permitting those agreements
that result in some substantial improvement in the allocation of resources despite the fact that they result in some derogation from the
theory of "pure" competition.
b. "[W]hile reserving to consumers an equitable share in the
profit....." Although there has been no Court of Justice decision interpreting this requirement, there have been several Commission decisions
on this point.88 Clearly "profit" means more than lower prices.8 9 In two
decisions, the Commission indicated that consumers benefited from the
exclusive agreements involved "because [the agreements made it]
... easier for them to obtain foreign-made products adapted to their
habits that can be quickly delivered."9 0
However, the Commission noted:
[he word "profit" must not be understood as meaning only
improvement in the distribution of the products, which, if it leads
88

See decisions cited in note 75 supra.

89 Patricelli, supra note 35, at 59-60; Schwartz, supra note 48, at 631.
90 Decision of Comm'n on D.R.U:Blondel Agreement, 2 CCH Comm. MKT, REP.

9049, at 8099 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
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to a broader choice or to greater purchasing possibilities, also
benefits the consumers ....

It also means other advantages result-

ing from rationalization; the consumers must also share in this,
particularly with respect to prices and other conditions of sale. 91
The Commission then proceeded to find that the substantial price
differences between France and Germany made possible by absolute
territorial protection precluded "consumers from being given a fair
92
share of the profit resulting from the improvement alleged.
The Commission apparently failed to consider, in Grundig-Consten, the fact that savings in costs due to an exclusive agreement may be
passed on to the consumer in the form of increased services rather than
in the form of lower prices and that the higher prices charged within
the contract territory could be explained upon the basis that Consten
was less efficient than other distributors rather than upon the basis
that Consten's "absolute territorial protection" enabled it to extract
exorbitant profits. 93 However, the decision can be read in another
manner which would eliminate these difficulties.
In D.R.U.-Blondel and Hummel-Isbecque,94 the Commission

noted:
An increase in prices compared to those charged in the country
of origin does not appear to be economically possible, if only because of the preventive element provided by the possibility that
the goods might be imported by other enterprises purchasing them
from an intermediary located outside the contractual territory
("parallel imports"), which tends to maintain stability of prices. 95
Thus, in Grundig-Consten,the Commission was not concerned with the
difference in prices per se. Rather, the Commission was apparently
concerned with the possibility that Consten was in fact more efficient
than its higher prices indicated and that, due to the impossibility of

parallel imports, there was no assurance that competition in the contract goods would force Consten to pass the benefits of increased efficiency (resulting from the exclusive agreement) on to consumers.96
91 1 CCH COMM. MKT. Rap. 2743, at 1865-66.
92 Id. at 1866.
93 Patricelli, supra note 35, at 61.
94 Decision of Comm'n on Hummel-Isbecque Agreement, 2 CCH Cosr. IKT. RaP.
9063 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
95 Id. at 8099.
96 Patricelli, supra note 35, at 61-62. The Commission has thus given the "fair share"
requirement a separate function. Presumably, the Commission could have considered the
question of whether the agreement permitted the parties to charge higher prices in its
consideration of the "improvement" requirement. However, it has chosen to consider this
factor in its consideration of the "fair share" requirement and has thus given the latter
a separate function from that performed by the "improvement" requirement. Id. at 62.
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c. "[Agreement must not] impose on the enterprises concerned
any restrictionsnot indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives . . . " The Commission's interpretation of this requirement appears to vary in direct response to the "seriousness of the anti-competitive effects." 97 Thus, in D.R. U.-Blondel, the Commission stated that the
improvements resulting from an exclusive sales agreement
could not have been obtained otherwise than through a restriction
of competition, namely through the granting of an exclusive
license, which can at present be considered as absolutely necessary
to create such advantages. The facts known to the Commission
lead to the conclusion that, in this particular case, it would have
been impossible to further improve distribution by another sales
systemY8
However, in the Faience Convention99 recommendation disapproving,
for lack of the requisite indispensability, a minimum stock requirement
contained in an arrangement of reciprocal exclusivity between groups
of buyers and sellers, the Commission noted:
The application of paragraph 3 of Article 85 presupposes that
it would be absolutely impossible to achieve the positive objectives
mentioned-or at any rate that their achievement would not be
absolutely certain ...."DO
And, in Grundig-Consten, the Commission, in refusing an exemption
for the absolute territorial protection granted to Consten, noted:
If, through a relaxation of territorial protection, the goal of improving production and distribution of the goods could no longer
be attained, then absolute territorial protection would be indispensable. If, however, even under these conditions, improvement of
prpductipn and of distribution of the goods were still possible,
absolute territorial protection would not be indispensable.'01
Schwartz, supra note 46, at 634.
The restriction' of competition must be a restriction prohibited by article 85(1) and
must not, for example, restrict competition only in third countries. Patricelli, supra
note 35, at 64.
9049, at 8099 (emphasis added).
98 2 CCH Corm. MKT. REP.
99 Commission Recommendation On Application of Treaty Afticle 85 ('Faience
2741 (1965).
Convention"), 1 CCH Comrr. MKT. RxP.
100 Zd. at 157.
2743, at 1866. Cf. White Motor Co. v. United States,
101 1 CCH Coamm. MKT. REP.
372 U.S. 253 (1963):
Another pertinent inquiry would explore the availability of less restrictiye
alternatives. In the present case, for example, as the Government suggests, it may
appear at the trial that whatever legitimate business needs White advances for
territorial limitations could be adequately served, with less damage to competition, through other devices ....
Id. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The portion of the Commission's decision quoted in the text raises the question of
97
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In its decision prior to the decision of the Court of Justice in
Grundig, the Commissioi followed the practice of examining each
alleged improvement to determine whether or not the restriction of
competition was indispensable.102 If the restriction involved was not

indispensable for any one of the alleged improvements, the entire agreement would be denied an exemption. 10 3 The Commission could, however, enjoin only those practices that it found objectionable, thereby
indicating to the parties the manner in which they could modify the
agreement in order to come within the exemption of article 85(3).104
Although the Court of Justice approved the Commission's practice
of examining each alleged improvement separately,10 5 the Court disapproved of the Commission's denial of an exemption to the entire
agreement if the restriction of competition was not indispensable to
the achievement of any one improvement101 This would appear to be
a desirable result. Under the Commission's practice, the parties were
required either to abandon the agreement or modify it as indicated by
the Commission. If they chose to modify, presumably the parties were
whether the agreement would have failed to fulfill the requiremeits of article 85(3), if,
without absolute territorial protbction, it would not have been possible to improve
distribution and production to the same degree as was possible with absolute territorial
protection. In Grundig, Advocate General Rooemer rioted:
[i]t must be emphasih'd . . .that ihe sole triteriohi [of indispensability] can only
be whether without the clause providing territorial protection it would be
possible to achieve in the same way, to the same extent, and with the same
intensity exactly those imprbveim6nbs thai can be achieved by the . . . contract
and that are recdgnized as useful and deserving protection from an over-all
economic viewpoint.
1961-66 CCH CoiM. MKi. REP'. f 8046, at 7677.
102 See Decision of the Confiinission Oki Gruhdig-Consteri Agreemeni, 1 CCH CoM~r.
2743 (EEC Comm'si 1965):
MKT. REP.
The practice of examining each alleged improvement seriatim can lead to a problem
of circularity. In Grundig-Consten, the Commission assumed an improvement of distribution, see text at note 82 supra; and then proceeded to determine *hether the
restriction was indispensable to each alleged improvement.
Assume the Commission had found that the restriction was in fdct indispehsable.
The Commission would then be preseited with the problem of deteriiiig wliether
or not the agreement did in fact lead to an improvement. Assume that in angweririg this
question, the Commission applies a "balancing" test and finds that on the whole, the
agreement leads to an improvement. Must the Commission how rturn to the 'indispensability" requirement in order to deierminie whether the restrictioxi is required in
order to achieve the net improvement? See Patricelli, supra hote 35, at 51.
The Commission did not appear to examine the agreement to determine whether
the restriction was indispensable to ensure that consumers received a fair share of the profit.
For the argument that the C~mmissi6n shouid hive dne this, see id. at 66.
2743, at 1868.
103 See 1 CCH CoBr. MKT.REP.
104 See id. at 1868-96.
105 See 1961-66 CCH CoMmf. MKT. REP. 1 8046, at 7655-57.
106 Id. at 7653-54.
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required to notify the Commission of the agreement as modified and
to request an exemption or a negative clearance. 10 7 This procedure
would be unnecessary if, in one proceeding, the Commission could
indicate those provisions of the agreement that, if eliminated, would
permit the exemption of the remainder.
In Grundig, the Court held that absolute territorial protection
was not indispensable to advance planning, guarantee and customer
service, maximum exploitation of the market, and the conduct of
market surveys. In rejecting the parties' contention that without territorial protection Consten would not undertake the costs of promotion
(leading to less than the maximum exploitation of the markets), the
Court stated:
[T]he plaintiffs' argument would in essence be tantamount to
asserting that without absolute territorial protection the sole distributor would not have accepted the conditions agreed to. This
circumstance, however, has no relationship to the improvements
of distribution mentioned in Article 85, paragraph 3.108
It is submitted that this portion of the opinion should be read in
the context of the facts of the case before the Court. Angelo Reati, a
member of the Directorate General for Competition of the EEC Commission has noted,10 9 as discussed above, 110 that some form of territorial
protection may serve to promote competition in some circumstances
(particularly where a small to medium firm is attempting to introduce
a new product into a new market where there is lively inter-brand
competition). Thus, the statement of the Court noted above should be
read as prohibiting only absolute territorial protection for an unlimited period granted by a large established manufacturer to a large
(or, at least, established) dealer.
d. "[Agreement must not]

. ..

enable [the concerns in question]

...to eliminate competition in respect of a substantialproportion of
the goods concerned." Since this requirement appears to indicate that
certain effects of an agreement on the market will not be tolerated no
matter how great the improvements of distribution or production,
paragraph (b) of article 85(3) "is crucial in the exemption scheme.""'
The Commission's discussion of this requirement has been less than
complete however. For example, in Hummel-Isbecque, the Commission
confined its discussion to the following observations:
107

See pp. 388-89 supra.

108 1961-66 CCH COMm. MKT.
109 See Reat, supra note 6,at

REP. 8046, at 7656.
139-46.

110 See p. 382 supra.
111 Patriceli, supra note 35, at 67.
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The Hummel products are in direct competition with similar
products offered for sale in Belgium both by Isbecque and by other
enterprises. Furthermore, Isbecque, in its capacity as exclusive
dealer, does not have absolute territorial protection; consequently,
the agreement does not enable the enterprises concerned to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods con2
cerned."
Thus, the official statements of the Commission prior to regulation
1 14
67/67113 offer little aid in an attempt to interpret this requirement.
Regulation 67/67 does not serve to change the situation to any
great extent. The regulation notes:
Since competition at the distribution stage is ensured by the
possibility of parallel imports, the exclusive dealing agreements

subject to this regulation will not, as a rule, make it possible to
eliminate competition for a substantial part of the products concerned." 5
The quoted portion of the regulation appears to indicate that "eliminate competition for a substantial part of the goods concerned" refers,
at the very least, to the ability of the parties to eliminate intrabrand
competition. This interpretation would be consistent with the interpretation offered by Advocate General Roemer in the Geitling" case
decided under article 65(2)(c) of the ECSC Treaty:
Article 85 is aimed not at the aggregate effect of the cartel agreement on the market, but at the exclusion of competition between
the parties to the agreement themselves, that is, at what the applicants called the "internal effect of the agreement". 117
However, regulation 67/67 also notes that the Commission will
examine a specific agreement that apparently comes within the terms
of the group exemption if there is reason to suspect a lack of vigorous
inter-brand competition.'" This provision is particularly important
with respect to the potential anti-competitive effects of exclusive purchase agreements" 9 and is apparently in accord with the Court's deci112

2 CCH CoMmr. MKT. REP.

113 1 CCH

9063, at 8139.

Co ataL MKT. REP.
2727-27J (1967).
114 This requirement probably prevents any agreement constituting "an abuse of a
dominant position" from obtaining an exemption. Patricelli, supra note 35, at 50. This
requirement is also apparently directed at potential as well as actual ability to eliminate
competition. Id. at 68. As to the term "substantial part," see id. at 73.
115 1 CCH Comm. MaT. REP.
2727, at 1820.
116 "Geitling" Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft m.b.H. v. High Auth., 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 113 (EEC Ct. Just. 1962).
117 Id. at 127 (emphasis in original).
118 Regulation 67/67, arts. 6(a), (b), 1 CCH Comit. MKT. RaP.
2727F (1967).
119 See p. 381 supra.
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sion in Geitling 2° and the Court's decision concerning artile 85(1)
in S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen.121
2. Regulation 67/67
Regulation 67/67122 appears to be consistent with the interpretations of article 85(3) noted in section III. The regulation notes that
exclusive dealing agreements result in an improvement in distribution
because:
[A]n enterprise can concentrate its selling activities, is not obliged
to maintain a multiplicity of business ties with a large number of
dealers, and, since it deals with only a single dealer, can more easily
overcome the marketing difficulties resulting from linguistic, legal,
or other differences. Exclusive dealing agreements facilitate the
sales promotion of a product and make possible a more intensive
exploitation of the market and a continuous supply while at the
same time rationalizing distribution. 12
In addition, the regulation notes that consumers receive a fair share of
the profit "since they can obtain goods manufactured in other countries
more quickly and more conveniently."'1 24 The regulation also appears12 to recognize the "indispensability" of exclusive agreements by
noting that "the designation of an exclusive dealer or of an exclusive
purchaser who assumes the sales promotion, customer service, and
maintenance of stock~s for the producer is pften the only way small and
medium-size enterprises can enter the market as competitors."' 26 Finally, the regulation states that since the agreements covered by regulation 67/67 may not prevent parallel imports, the agreements will not
"make it possible to eliminate competition for a substantial part of the
products concerned." 27
The Court of Justice, in the Italy case .28 indicated that a group
120 "Geitling" Ruhrkohlen-Vercaufsgesellschaft m.b.H. v. High Auli., I Comm. Mkt.
L.R: 113 (EEC Ct. Just. 1962).
121 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8053 (EEC Ct. Just. 1967).
122 1 CCH Coma.
MKT. REP. 5 2727-27J (1967).
123 Id.
2727, at 1819.
124 Id. at 1820.
125 One comsentator is of the opinion that thl Commission has ',completely
ignored" the requirement of indispernsability in regulation 67/67. Kelleher, supra note
53, at 1240. It does seem clear that the Commission has had difficulty with the requirements set forth in article 85(3). Cf. Ladas, Exclusive Distribution Agreements and the
Common Market Antitrust Laws, 9 ANTITRUST Biu.L. 761, 767 (1964).
126 1 CH Comr. Mjr. ]4n.
2727, at 1819..
127 Id. at 1820.
128 Italy v. EEC Council & EEC Comm'n, 1961-66 CCH CoMm. MKT. '
. 8048
(EEC Ct. Jtst. 1906).
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exemption is only a "framework" arid that an agreement coming within
the terms of this framework "need not because of this necessarily ful:
fill the conditions of [article 85] paragraph 1."129 In light of the limitations contained in regulation 67/67 and the Cdurt of Justice decisions
interpreting article 85(1), one may question the need for regulation
67/67.
Regulation 67/67 provides that exclusive purchase and exclusive
sales agreements are not within the terms of the regulation if the
parties use industrial property rights or take other measures to restrict
intra-brand competition. 130 In addition, the regulation indicates that
the Commission will closely scrutinize any agreement apparently
within the terms of the group exemption if it appears that the contract
goods are riot shbject to inter-brand competition. In the case of exclusive purchase contracts, the agreement will be scrutinized if other
manufacturers have difficulty in locating outlets for their goods, oit
if the contractual products ard sold at excessive prices; or if the dealer
refuses to deal with other dealers located withini the contract territory
who cannot obtain the goods elsewhere under reasonable conditions
unless the dealer has "an objectively justifiable reason" for his refusal. 131
The Court of Justice has indicated that the validity of exclusive
agreements depends upon an aialysis of a number of factors and that
this type of agreement is not automatically prohibited by article
85(1). 132 As noted above, the Court appeared to interpret article 85(1)
as prohibiting only those agreements that affect the formation of a
common market to more than a de minimis extent by erecting barriers
to trade between the member states.133 Given the fact that exclusive
purchase and exclusivie sales agreements can further the integration of
formerly separate markets134 and the fact that these agreements will
possess the greatest anticompetitive effects primarily in those situations
excluded from the complete exemption provided by regulation 67/67,
the regulation seems to apply only to those agreements that hinder the
formation of a common market to a de minimis extent. If this is so,
most, if not all, of the agreements that come within the terms of regulation 67/67 are not prohibited by article 85(1).
Regulation 67/67 was issued after the decisions of the Court of
Justice interpreting article 85(1). If the argument advanced in the
129 Id. at 7718.
130 Regulation 67/67, art. 3(b), 1 CCH Comme. MKT. REP.
131 Regulation 67/67, art. 6, 1 CCH Coma. MKT. REi'.

132 See p. 392 supra.
133 See p. 397 supra.
134 See p. 391 supra.

2727C (1967).

2727F. (1967).
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preceding paragraph is correct, why did the Commission bother to
issue regulation 67/67?
As previously noted, by 1965 over 36,000 exclusive dealing agreements had been notified to the Commission,1 35 and of these, 11,628 had
been notified on Form B-l, the form that was rendered obsolete by
regulation 67/67.136 After the Court of Justice decisions, the Commission was faced with the alternatives of requesting the parties to
these agreements to apply for a negative clearance, 137 issuing negative
clearances without application by the parties, examining each agreement and issuing separate decisions granting exemptions 138 or issuing
a group exemption (which, according to the Italy case, 139 would not
necessarily create the impression that all of these agreements violated
article 85(1)) with such qualifications as would permit the Commission
to examine the possible denial of an exemption at its leisure without
delaying a decision on a large number of clearly permissible agreements. The Commission, it is submitted, adopted the last alternative
by issuing regulation 67/67.
CONCLUSION

In light of the importance of eliminating present barriers to trade
and of preventing the establishment of new ones, the Court has decided
that article 85(3) must be interpreted narrowly. Otherwise many barriers to trade would be permitted and the goals of the treaty might
never be achieved.
Ultimately, the Court's interpretation may not prove sufficient.
The experience of the United States indicates that the mere removal
of state barriers to trade does not in itself ensure the proper functioning of market forces. It is also necessary to prohibit anti-competitive
agreements that might not erect barriers to trade under the Court's
current interpretation. The important consideration is the prevention
of agreements that interfere with the operation of those market-forces
that the removal of barriers to trade is designed to encourage.
If the Court were to adopt a broader interpretation of article
85(1), its interpretation of article 85(3) would also change. If article
85(1) were to be interpreted as prohibiting agreements that restrict
135 See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 638 n.100.
136 Id.

137
138
139
at 7718

See pp. 388-89 supra.
See p. 389 supra.
Italy v. EEC Council & EEC Comm'n, 1961-66 CCH Co'm. MKT. REP.
(EEC Ct. Just. 1966).
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competition even if they do not erect barriers to trade between the
member states, the Commission and the Court should then examine
each practice that comes before them to determine whether in fact
the practice will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources despite
the fact that the practice interferes to some degree with the preservation of "pure" competition.
The Court's interpretation may be required by the language of
the treaty and the limited jurisdiction granted to the Community
institutions. 140 Also, at this early stage of development, it may be best
for the Court to concentrate upon the removal of barriers to trade.
Finally, the Court's interpretation might also be considered as resulting
from the only types of cases it has been required to consider up to now.
Only future cases and decisions will indicate whether the Court will
interpret article 85 in a more sweeping manner.
140 One of the prime motives for the formation of the EEC was the hope that
economic integration would ultimately "spill" over into political integration. See L.
LINDBERG, TnE POLITICAL DYNAMics OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 9 (1963). This
has not occurred to any great extent. In fact, in recent years, there has been a resurgence
of nationalism and the member states appear to be increasingly jealous of their prerogatives as sovereign states (at least in the case of France). The Court has thus been faced
with the problem of balancing the interests of the Community organs in ensuring the
formation of a common market against the fear on the part of at least one member state
of granting the Community increased powers to "interfere" in domestic affairs.
The Court may have solved this problem by interpreting article 85(1) so as to limit
the Commission's jurisdiction to those types of practices that are of most direct concern
to the Community, i.e., those practices that interfere with the removal of barriers to trade
between the member states. Other practices that may restrict, distort, or prevent competition are left to the jurisdiction of the individual member states.

